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Abstract
Behavioural public policy is associated with the rising influence of psychological and behavioural
sciences on systems of government. Related policies are based on the assumption of human
irrationality and use a series of often unconsciously oriented policy tools to pursue varied public
policy goals. This paper argues that existing critical analyses of behavioural public policy can be
categorized as post-political in their orientation. Post-political theory is primarily concerned with
how political consensuses, particularly around expert forms of government administration,
tend to close off opportunities for political contestation and challenge. Drawing on an empirical
case study of emerging forms of behavioural public policy in the Netherlands, this paper
challenges some of the core assumptions of post-political critiques of behavioural governance.
The case of the Netherlands is also used to challenge the often absolutist assumptions about the
nature of the political, expertise, and consensus that characterize post-political forms of inquiry
more generally.
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Introduction – On the psychological state
Behavioural public policy (BBP) has emerged as an approach to governance which spans
multiple policy sectors (including public health, personal finance and consumer policy, envi-
ronment and transport, labour markets, education, and urban policy inter alia), multiple
scales, and has global appeal (see European Commission, 2016; Lunn, 2014; OECD, 2017;
Whitehead et al., 2014; World Bank, 2015). It is an approach which uses emerging psycho-
logical insights regarding human behaviour to inform the policy-making process. BBP
has been described by both proponents and critical scholars as a new era of behavioural
governance, which has the potential to radically transform state–citizen relations, the effec-
tiveness and impact of government action, and our basic understandings of human freedom
and character (Halpern, 2015; Sanders, et al., 2018; Sunstein, 2014; Whitehead et al., 2017).
BPP is psychological in two respects. First, it has positioned contemporary social, polit-
ical, and economic crises such as the Great Recession, climate change, and public health
challenges as, at least in part, behavioural problems. Second, BPP builds on advances within
the cognitive and psychological sciences concerning human irrationality (Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman et al., 1982; Thaler, 2015). The BBP project is thus predicated on humanizing
homo-economicus and emphasizes the crucial role that intuition, (social) imitation, heuris-
tics, and emotion play in human behaviour. Building on the work of behavioural economics
and cognitive design, BPPs utilize the ‘gentle power’ of nudges and associated psychological
tools of behavioural government in order to shape choice while, purportedly, preserving
individual freedom (Oliver, 2013; Shafir, 2013; Sunstein, 2014; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
The emergence of psychological state apparatuses, which seek to respond to the afore-
mentioned crises and epistemological developments, has been subject to concerted academic
scrutiny and critique. Some have questioned the impact that behavioural policies will have
on citizens’ autonomy and their ability to shape their own behavioural destinies (Furedi,
2011; White, 2013). Others have brought into question the limited capacity of the psycho-
logical and cognitive sciences to effectively explain human behaviour outside of the fairly
limited frame of proximate contextual influences (Davies and Doyle, 2015; Strauss, 2009;
Tallis, 2011). Many have interrogated the extent to which new behavioural policies actually
seek to address the problems generated by neoliberal policy-making, or whether they simply
facilitate the continued roll-out of neoliberalism by processes of responsibilization and
desocialization (Berndt, 2015: 569; Carter, 2015; Davies, 2014; Jones et al., 2013; Leggett,
2014; Whitehead et al., 2017). Underlying the majority of these critiques has been a concern
that BPP is characterized by a rise of state-sponsored behavioural manipulation, the dim-
inution of personal freedom, and the broader closing off of political debate concerning the
role of markets, states, and structural inequalities within society. This paper asserts that
these critiques can each be read through the lens of post-political theory.
The concept of the post-political was popularized during the late 1990s and early 2000s
through the work of scholars such as Chantal Mouffe (2005), Slavoj Zizek (1999), Jacques
Rancie`re (2004), and Erik Swyngedouw (2007), who argued against emerging forms of
political consensus, particularly those formed around expert forms of government admin-
istration, that tend to close off opportunities for political contestation and challenge (see
Gill et al., 2012 for a synthesis of these debates). BPP is, ostensibly at least, post-political in
three ways: (1) it promotes an expert consensus on the nature of human action and how best
to govern it (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008); (2) through psychological techniques that target
the unconscious, it pursues approaches to public administration which may prove difficult
to contest, and which may in the long term be a threat to forms of active citizenship; and (3)
by positioning intractable social and global problems as primarily issues of personal
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behaviour, it, potentially, forecloses alternative perspectives on the political framing of
solutions, the scope of political debate, and the contested status of the ‘public good’.
This paper has two main goals. First, it links emerging critiques of BPP with the concerns
of post-political scholarship. Second, and through consideration of the emergence of a BPP
apparatus in the Netherlands, it questions some of the core assumptions of post-political
lines of inquiry. Analysis thus provides an alternative framework to think critically about
BPP, while utilizing empirical insights into emerging systems of government in the
Netherlands to complicate the notion of the post-political. This paper takes as its point
of departure Gill et al.’s (2012: 510) call to ‘establish where the post-political consensus is
most and least firmly established’, to pay attention to the pragmatics of politics, and to
acknowledge that the post-political is an unfinished and partial project. But in distinction
from Gill et al., we claim that the presence of the political in, ostensibly, post-political
processes is not merely about the unfinished, or partial, nature of the post-political, but
part of an ongoing dialectic between the political and post-political. The case of the
Netherlands ultimately demonstrates the ongoing, if often mundane and overlooked, strug-
gles that surround the development of BBP, and how these very ordinary struggles can lead
to the emergence of alternative and diverse policy forms.
The research presented in this paper draws on two research projects, which were sup-
ported by the UK’s Leverhulme Trust and Economic and Social Research Council, respec-
tively. These projects explored the emergence of behavioural governance over a nine-year
period. In specific terms, the paper reflects on a series of interviews that were carried out
with policy-makers and government advisors in the Netherlands during 2014.1 These inter-
views were carried out at a time when different branches of the Dutch state, and the bodies
that advise it, were considering the potential applications and implications of BPP. The
Netherlands was selected as a case study because (1) it is a country where the insights of BPP
have been widely incorporated into government policy, have influenced the actions of
various civil society groups, and have been the object of concerted forms of academic
scrutiny; (2) it offered a research context within which the early uptake of BPP policy
ideas, and their political and post-political affects, could be studied by the authors.
Ultimately, we argue that an empirical focus on those involved in the shaping of BPP in
the Netherlands can help to challenge some of the more sweeping abstractions of theories of
the post-political (Gill et al., 2012: 517).
The psychological state and the post-political condition
It is important to acknowledge that, as far as we are aware, post-political ideas have
not been applied directly to the study of the systems of behavioural government we are
concerned with in this paper. Nonetheless, critiques of BPP have consistently identified
processes of de-politicization and de-socialization at play in the psychological explanations
of human conduct offered in justifications for BPP (see Leggett, 2014). In order to situate
this project, this section provides an overview of existing work on the post-political and how
it connects with critical studies of BPP.
Chantal Mouffe (2005) identifies the existence of the post-political condition within the
popular ontologies of modern ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, ‘good governance’, and ‘global
civil society’ (2). These ontological presumptions became increasingly common during the
1990s, when partisan historical divisions appeared to be giving way to global liberal cos-
mopolitanism. What characterized these widely embraced political systems are the notions
of rational consensus building, mutual interest, and deliberation. According to Mouffe,
however, what these democratic systems ultimately tend towards was a negation of
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antagonism and a diminution of the ‘antagonistic dimension [that is] constitutive of “the
political”’ (Mouffe, 2005: 2) (see Barnett, 2017 here for a broader discussion of the con-
nections between politics and presumptions of antagonism). In addition to the effective
absence of contestation – or dissensus – Swyngedouw (2007) argues that the post-political
condition is characterized by a generalized failure to make particular political demands
universal, or to transform particularized problems from local technical issues, into more
radical universal demands. A further key aspect of the post-political condition is highlighted
by Zizek (1999), when he describes how ‘the conflict of global ideological visions embodied
in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened
technocrats.’ According to Zizek, the practice of consensus is synonymous with the emer-
gence of expert elites and bureaucrats, who operate through complex systems of para-state
governance and offer pragmatic systems of ‘what works’ government that are based upon
supposedly neutral forms of scientific knowledge. Such pragmatic, solutions-focused gov-
ernance techniques are a key feature of BPP.
According to Rancie`re (2004), a key dimension of the post-political condition is not the
exclusion of troublesome political perspectives from consensus politics, but their negotiated
– and inevitably de-radicalized – inclusion within consensus politics. If politics is defined,
as Rancie`re (2004) suggests, as the disturbance of the social order by those who are external
to that order, then consensual accommodation serves to deny the space for politics through
strategies of inclusion. Zizek (1999) claims that post-political strategies of inclusion essen-
tially disavow politics by only allowing forms of contestation that do not threaten the socio-
political order (for a summary of Rancie`re and Zizek in relation to issues of post-political
tactics of inclusion, see Gill et al., 2012: 511–514). Ultimately, the reflections of Rancie`re
and Zizek suggest that the presence of apparent political dispute and contestation does not
necessarily signal the breakdown of the post-political – indeed it may be supporting it.
The critical line of distinction then becomes between where the post-political ends and
the ‘properly political’ begins (see Temenos, 2017).
There are many ways in which it is possible to investigate BPP through post-political
thought.2 In this paper, however, we are primarily interested in the compelling parallels that
exist between critiques of emerging systems of behavioural government and post-political
analysis. The parallels can be seen in at least three key respects. First of all, critical analyses
of BPP have described the emergence of a rapid scientific consensus around the insights of
behavioural economics and related psychologically informed theories of human decision-
making (see, e.g. Berndt, 2015; Jones et al., 2013; Leggett, 2014). In part, the assertion of an
emerging consensus in behavioural government is understandable to the extent that it
provides a justification for the critical scrutiny scholars have developed and an explanation
for the rapid spread of these ideas and practices around the world. Accounts of an emerging
consensus regarding BPP have corresponded with analyses of the advent of new expert
behavioural units devoted to delivering related policies (see John, 2013). The institutional
form of these new expert units tends to be characterized by flat, non-hierarchical forms, with
relatively high degrees of functional separation from government departments. While these
Skunkworks styles of government support the experimental ethos of psychological state
forms, they perpetuate concerns over their unaccountability, and their non- or para-state
form. The purported consensual power of the behavioural sciences and the formation of
expert units of behavioural insight policy-making directly mirror and, to some extent,
deepen post-political concern about the uncontested, and even uncontestable, nature of
emerging systems of behavioural government.
The second general parallel between critiques of BPP and post-political thought can be
seen in the obfuscating political effects of related policies. Through the common deployment
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of the gentle power of nudge techniques, BPP often relies on the targeting of the uncon-
scious and the manipulation of choice (White, 2013). From the resetting of default options on
company pension schemes and organ donor registers, to the exploitation of cognitive biases
in human decision-making (such as tendencies to discount the future relative to the present),
BPP quite deliberately seek to change human behaviours without recourse to conscious
persuasion. Evolving forms of behavioural government seek to exploit our own foibles
(perhaps an unconscious tendency to prefer status quo to change or an instinct to follow
the social herd rather than go our own way) in order to achieve broader shifts in social
conduct. While the manipulation of our cognitive failings may, in the long term, bring us
welfare benefits, many have questioned the implications of these strategies for political life
(Leggett, 2014; Mettler, 2011; White, 2013).
The third point of connection between post-political concerns and behavioural govern-
ment operates at the level of human subjectivity. In his acerbic critique of behavioural
economics and related policy developments, Furedi (2011) focuses less on the impacts
which nudge-style policies have on governments’ relations with their citizens, and more
on their effects on the political capacities of individuals (it is interesting to note that ques-
tions of the political capacities of individuals are not a central concern of post-political
analyses as they tend to focus much more on the broader societal implications of post-
political forms). Furedi argues that BPPs are based upon an assumption that people lack the
necessary willpower to exercise effective forms of moral autonomy (134–141). In alignment
with post-political critiques, he has argued that BBP involves the mobilization of a degree of
‘scientism’ in order to refute the moral autonomy of individuals (Furedi, 2011). On the basis
of this transformation, Furedi claims that behavioural policies show intolerance for private
preferences while removing the valuable learning experiences that being wrong can bring to
people. From a post-political perspective, intolerance for private choice could militate
against opportunities for political contestation. Although, as Gill et al. (2012) point out,
the relationship between the post-political and questions of tolerance is uncertain. While
certain forms of overt intolerance could prompt political opposition, in other instances,
tolerance could itself be seen as a strategy of consensual inclusion and de-politicization.
Perhaps the most direct application of post-political forms of critique to BBP can be
found in the work of Leggett (2014). In one sense, Leggett’s work counters post-political
critiques of BBP. Leggett argues that if, as BBP suggests, government is most effectively
realized in the minutiae of everyday choice environments, then it also invites us to see
opportunities for forms of resistance in a multitude of quotidian contexts, and not to see
politics as only residing in the proper spaces of public contestation (Leggett, 2014).
In another sense, however, Leggett’s work suggests an overtly post-political dissection of
the limits of BBP. Thinking about BBP from an explicitly social democratic perspective,
Leggett points out the ways in which BBP obscures the social determinants of behavioural
capabilities and opportunities. Crucially, Leggett begins to chart what a properly political-
ized version of the BBP could be. On Leggett’s terms, the politicization of BBP should,
rightfully, see the emergence of an interventionist state that is more willing to protect its
citizens from the exploitative behavioural dynamics of commercial capitalism. Leggett
argues that armed with the insights of the behavioural sciences, the social democratic
state could use traditional forms of regulation to counter the pernicious, and individualiz-
ing, outcomes of neoliberalism. This vision is, of course, very different from the actual use of
behavioural insights within BBP to achieve policy goals that militate against the worst
effects of neoliberalism, but ultimately do little to challenge it hegemony. As this paper
demonstrates, there is evidence of the potential emergence of more radical versions of BBP
(albeit, not as dramatic as those outlined by Leggett) (see Whitehead et al., 2017). This paper
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also reveals that these more insurgent forms of BBP can originate from fairly mundane
forms of contestation.
There have been a series of critiques of post-political theory that this paper seeks to build
on and extend (see Gill et al., 2012; Lees, 2013; Temenos, 2017). From a critical geograph-
ical perspective, Gill et al. (2012) have suggested that greater attention should be given to the
uneven development of the post-political condition, essentially supporting the notion that
from state-to-state and sector-to-sector, the extent of the post-political may vary greatly.
Gill et al. (2012) have also argued for a more ‘worldly grounded view of political deliber-
ation’ (509), which recognizes the places where overlooked forms of politics remain. In a
related sense, Temenos (2017) has questioned the political absolutism of post-political the-
orists. According to Temenos, the suggestion that many post-political theorists make that
only truly radical forms of political contestation can be considered properly political denies
the power and importance of other genuinely politically moments. As Gill et al. (2012) point
out, ‘[c]ontestation is more ordinary than the radical post-structural continental philoso-
phers might admit’ (517). Even if more mundane forms of contestation are not considered to
be properly political, the question remains as to whether the political can ever be as utterly
disavowed as post-political accounts would suggest (Gill et al., 2012; Lees, 2013). Building
on the work of Gill et al. (2012), we reject ‘adherence to a purist, ontological vision of
politics’ (517) and search overlooked forms of politics within BPP. This endeavour serves
not only to disrupt and extend post-political inquiry, but also to challenge many existing
critiques of BPP.
Building the psychological state in the Netherlands: On consensus
and expertise
This section considers recent attempts to build a more psychologically oriented state
apparatus in the Netherlands. Analysis utilizes this construction process as a basis for
problematizing the assumptions of consensus formation and the institutionalization of exper-
tise that are characteristic of critical accounts of BPP policies and post-political analysis
more generally.
The 2009 government as choice architect symposium and the behavioural interregnum
As with many governments around the world, the Dutch state has been influenced by the
insights of the behavioural and psychological sciences for many decades (Rose, 1998). It was
not, however, until 2008 that policy-makers in the Netherlands started taking a strategic
interest in BPP science. The commencement of this interest was signalled in 2008 when the
Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid (WRR)) proposed a symposium to explore the potential utility of the
behavioural sciences for policy-making. The WRR symposium was, in many ways, a
response to the engagement with the behavioural sciences that was evident within the UK
and US governments.3 The WRR symposium was convened in 2009 and entitled De overheid
als keuzearchitect (The Government as Choice Architect). It is possible to see the WRR
symposium as a technology of post-political consensus building in two ways. First, in hear-
ing international testimony from academics of different types, it sought to establish and
acknowledge the forms of scientific consensus that were emerging around BPP research.
Second, it sought to lay the foundations for political consensus about the potential utility of
behavioural insights for Dutch government officials (of course this consensus could, tech-
nically, have involved the acceptance or rejection of such ideas). The impacts of the
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symposium do, however, raise some interesting issues in relation to the practical mechanics
of consensus building that are rarely addressed in either the literature on BPP or the
post-political.
Although the WRR symposium event appeared to be met with enthusiasm by policy-
makers, it did not directly lead to the application of new behavioural insights to public
policy in the Netherlands. One of the explanations for this apparent inaction was the fact
that despite hosting the De overheid als keuzearchitect/the Government as Choice Architect
symposium, the WRR did not produce a formal note of advice to the Dutch state on the
application of new behavioural insights within government. While there are various
accounts of why the WRR did not formally advise government on adopting the insights
of the behavioural sciences, one participant in the 2009 symposium suggested that there were
actually three main reasons for inaction: (1) The fact that economic theories (even of the
behavioural kind) were not particularly influential in terms of the dominant paradigms of
the Council; (2) the Council did not generally take the emergence of a new set of academic
ideas as its basis for offering governmental advice (preferring, instead, premises such as
‘what will the Netherlands look like in 2030’; and (3) they were concerned over the potential
ethical implications of BBP, and, in particular, with issues of manipulation (Interview with
former WRR Member, May 2014).
It is interesting to think of the role that interdisciplinary rivalry (and possibly suspicion)
may have played in curtailing the emergence of an early behavioural insights coalition in the
Netherlands. What is clear in this instance – and has been widely acknowledged in the
studies of the sociology of science for some time – is that scientific consensus is about
more than merely evidence; it also involves the alignment of strategic disciplinary needs
and influence (Shapin, 1995). It is, perhaps, less surprising (given the wider critiques of BPP
discussed above) that a consensus did not emerge over the use of BPP in the Netherlands
due to concerns over the potentially manipulative nature of such policies. What is more
unexpected is that bureaucratic procedure – based on the notion that promoting BPP was
not within the constitutional remit of the WRR – should inadvertently inhibit the process of
consensus formation. Without the formal support of the WRR, the Dutch governmental
engagement with the behavioural sciences entered something of an interregnum. A report
was produced by the WRR summarizing the 2009 symposium, but this did not constitute a
formal advice to government. The WRR also gave its imprimatur to De Menselijke
Beslisser: Over de Psychologie Van Keuze en Gedrag (The Human Decision-Maker: the
psychology of choice and behaviour), which was published by the Amsterdam University
Press. Although these publications did not require a formal response from government, it is
interesting to note that they stimulated informal interest within the ranks of the Dutch
Civil Service.
The stalled behavioural consensus of the WRR challenges certain assumptions concern-
ing both BPP and the post-political. In the case of the Netherlands, it is clear that there was
not a rapid uptake of BPP as early discussions of their applications met academic, bureau-
cratic, and ethical resistance of sorts. This observation not only tests the potential validity of
post-political critiques of BPP (which tend to assume the formation of fairly instant politico-
scientific consensuses around the authority of the behavioural sciences – with science essen-
tially overriding politics), but also challenges, more broadly, post-political understanding of
the relationship between consensus and antagonism. It appears that in the case of the 2009
symposium, broad initial consensus eventually gave way to antagonism, expressed both in
relation to ethical concerns and interdisciplinary suspicion. Furthermore, it appears that the
WRR’s lack of formal action on BPP was the product of the procedural inertia generated
by its constitutional capacity. The policy interregnum that followed can thus be thought of
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as much as a vacuum of responsibility as it was the product of antagonism and the failure to
build a coalition of action. So, if a lack of consensus does not necessarily signal overt
antagonism, and consensus can easily give way to dissensus, it is important not to assume
that the post-political condition is either militated against by a lack of consensus or, nec-
essarily, guaranteed by consensual actions. The story of the early engagement between BPP
and Dutch public policy-making would indicate that post-political accounts of the nature
and work of consensus and antagonism are too binary: failing to recognize the complex
ways in which both conditions (and the various states that exist within and between them)
relate to political and post-political conditions. The example of WRR’s early interactions
with BBP reveals the inescapable co-existence of the political and post-political, whereby
early forms of relatively uncontested expert consensus over the value of BBP gave way to
both overt and more subtle forms of political and scientific resistance. To an extent, it is even
possible to discern a form of political resistance to BBP that deployed post-political means
(in the form of largely unchallenged expert defiance and bureaucratic inertia). To put things
simply then, the case of the Netherlands reveals that the arrival of BBPs has not always led
to consensus formation. The case also demonstrates that we should not be too quick to
associate consensus with the post-political, and the political with antagonism.
Institutionalizing behavioural expertise: Building a Dutch behavioural insight team
Despite placing an apparent brake on the development of BBPs, the interregnum that
followed the WRR’s 2009 symposium did not last long. While precise dates are difficult
to locate, it appears that by 2012, Dutch governmental interest in the behavioural sciences
was growing. Year 2012 is significant because it saw the establishment of the first behav-
ioural insights unit in the Dutch government. This small unit was formed in the Dutch
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment with initially two (full-time equivalent) staff.
This period also saw the first moves being made to form a more strategic and coordinated
engagement between the Netherlands’ central government and BPP. There appears to have
been at least three stimuli behind these developments. First, was the reported success of the
UK government’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) (Halpern, 2015).4 Second, came the
2012 election and the emergence of a Liberal and Labour coalition government headed
by Mark Rutte. The coalition was founded upon the principles of liberalism, but also
forged in a time of austerity. It appears that the low cost and libertarian nature of BBP,
and the fact that it appealed to groups across the political spectrum, meant that it resonated
well with the goals of Rutte’s coalition. The third stimulus behind these more strategic
developments was the contingent emergence of an opportune political moment for policy
experimentation. By 2014, it was evident that most of the major policy agendas associated
with the 2012 Coalition agreement had either been implemented or abandoned. The gov-
ernment was thus very open to explore new policy initiatives and ideas (Interview with
representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, May 2014). It was in this context
that in December 2014 Rutte’s Cabinet endorsed BBP, arguing that it promised to make
government more effective and efficient (Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands,
2017: 6).
It is important at this point to note a key distinction between the Dutch case and that of
the UK. The UK’s BIT had political support from its inception, with British Prime Minister
David Cameron being instrumental in its formation and even utilizing behavioural econom-
ics as a guiding principle in his new vision of caring Conservatism and a pragmatic state.
In the Netherlands, the promotion of BPP has been mainly supported by disparate parts of
the civil service, located in various governmental ministries, and only gained formal political
8 EPC: Politics and Space 0(0)
support later. Indeed, a major driving force for the coordinated use of new BBPs across
public policy in the Netherlands has come from the government’s Interdepartmental
Strategy Network. The membership of this Strategy Network is drawn from the civil service,
and it meets regularly to discuss new policy ideas and initiatives. Through the initiative of
the different ministries, it was decided to develop an intergovernmental behavioural Insights
initiative (this would eventually become the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands). The
first major meeting of this interdepartmental initiative was held in May 2013. Senior civil
servants, representatives from different scientific councils, and a broad cross-section of
ministerial staff were in attendance.
Before the formation of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands, there was signif-
icant discussion and debate about how best to support interdepartmental initiatives relating
to BBP in the long term. The Ministry of Economic Affairs lobbied for the formation of a
central BIT that would mirror the structure of the UK’s BIT. The formation of a single
Dutch behavioural insights unit did, however, raise concerns. First of all, it was not clear
where such a BIT would be located in the Dutch government. The structure of Dutch
governmental ministries is non-hierarchical, with no department having direct control
over others.5 Second, some claimed that having a single Dutch behavioural insights unit
would make it too easy a target for those who were suspicious of the application of the
behavioural sciences in public policy, and the narrow centralization of behavioural expertise
it is believed to entail. It was in these contexts that that the Behavioural Insights Network
Netherlands was eventually formed. This Network’s structure is based upon individual min-
istries pursuing BPP (sometimes in the context of formal BITs, as in the case of the Ministry
of Infrastructure and Environment’s team), with a collaboration hub (the Network) allow-
ing for the sharing of good practice.
The formation of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands raises the question of how
we might think about the institutionalization of expertise and control outside of more public
spheres of political action. In the Netherlands, BPP has emerged out of the machinations of
civil servants operating in the deep state, and as such signifies a managerial cadre of experts
which might rightfully be the target of post-political critical scholarship. This is in contrast
to the situation in the UK, where BPPs were explicitly supported by several white papers
and influential speeches within the Coalition government of 2010. While it is clear that the
Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands, and related ministerial behavioural insights ini-
tiatives, have offered conduits for new forms of expertise (particularly in the form of the
behavioural sciences and behavioural economics) to enter government in fairly subtle ways,
this has not necessarily been a post-political process.
Recent analyses of the emergence of BPP in the Netherlands indicate that there has been
an ongoing process of contestation and politicization of behavioural expertise (see Feitsma,
2018a, 2018b). The contestation of expertise has in part been a product of the inevitable
decisions that must be made in relation to which forms of expertise, with which particular
behavioural insights, should be engaged with. It has also been a result of the process of
working out which forms of behavioural expertise are actually most relevant to the policy-
making process itself (Feitsma, 2018b). Furthermore, the institutionalization of expertise is
not about bringing scientists into government, as it is governmental officials actively filtering
scientific insights to meet their own needs (Feitsma, 2018b). It is thus clear that the emer-
gence of BPP in the Netherlands has not so much involved the hard-wiring of behavioural
science expertise into government, but the training and re-purposing of existing civil serv-
ants in new policy-making skills (Feitsma and Schillemans, 2019). While this process could
be associated with the post-political production of uncontested expertise, our research
indicates that it has actually involved the institutionalization of the inexpert, or what
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Parsons (2002) has described as a process of muddling through at the policy–science inter-
face. BPP is generally not a part of the public administration training which many civil
servants in the Netherlands receive. As such, the processes of muddling through have seen
policy-makers in the Netherlands develop a fairly open set of engagements with the behav-
ioural sciences (although we acknowledge the dominant impacts of behavioural economics).
The post-political effects of expertise have thus been militated against by the fact that few
civil servants have been able to adopt positions of uncontestable expertise, and because BPP
has, from the outset, been subject to various adaptations and ‘corruptions’ to meet the needs
of policy-makers. While this process could not be described as political, it would be equally
inaccurate to suggest it was post-political.
The structure of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands has also facilitated oppor-
tunities for different ministries to engage and adapt different forms of expertise, and for
these adaptations to become points of policy contestation and debate within interdepart-
mental collaboration. There is some evidence that different governmental ministries in the
Netherlands are already challenging accepted behavioural policy norms (such as the use of
Randomized Controlled Trials) within their practise (Feitsma 2018a; 2018b). The case of
BPP making in the Netherlands thus draws attention to the vagaries of expertise within
politics. While it is clear that over time expertise can act in post-political ways, the actual
transfer of scientific ideas into public policy is rarely about the transmission of clear, and
uncontested, spheres of expertise into government.
Behavioural politics and the psychological state: On obfuscation
and autonomy
Ethics and obfuscation
One of the primary, if implicitly, post-political critiques of BPP is that in targeting many of
the subconscious drivers of human action, it tends to operate in a way that obscures its
modes of operation, becomes difficult to politically resist, and does not support the devel-
opment of capacities to act politically (Jones et al., 2013). Yet in the case of the Netherlands,
the accusation of political obfuscation (and manipulation) has become something of an
object of political and ethical debate and contestation itself. The common ethical criticism
of BPP is that it tends to involve the dark arts of manipulation and attempts to change
people’s behaviours in ways they may be unaware of and in directions they may not have
sanctioned (White, 2013).6 An interview we conducted with an erstwhile member of the
WWR revealed an unanticipated ethical debate concerning BBP. This debate was not just
about the manipulative potential of BBP, but sought to raise broader ethical questions
about the formulation and delivery of more conventional forms of public policy (such as
regulations, incentives, and educational initiatives). According to the representative of the
WRR, concerns about the ethics of BBPs stimulated wider debates about the often-
unacknowledged manipulative nature of established policy mechanisms and the ways in
which existing policies tended to yield greatest benefit to the wealthy well, and not the
most disadvantaged in society (Interview with former WRR Member, May 2014).
In this paper, we are not so much interested in the intricacies of this ethical debate, but in
the very fact that there is one. The debate about the ethics of BPP is evident beyond the
WRR and has also been present in the work of the Netherlands Centre for Ethics and Health
(see ten Have, 2014) and the Dutch Council for Social Development (RMO). In many ways,
these discussions indicate that as well as potentially obfuscating public policy, BPP provides
the grounds for renewed political debate about the nature of public policy itself.7
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In his recent analysis of the morality of BBPs, Cass Sunstein suggests that ethical issues
pertain to four core values: welfare, human dignity, autonomy, and self-government. When
it comes to public policy, and the varied acts of government, Sunstein (2016) recognizes that
the ethical values we prioritize are inevitably contested. The ethical debates concerning BPP
waged in the Netherlands appear, in part, to centre on the tensions between welfare,
personal autonomy, and human dignity. On the one hand, conventional policy approaches
that are based upon education and incentives appear to support values of personal auton-
omy (and the right to ignore a policy and go your own way) and human dignity (or the idea
that you are capable of making your own decisions and should be respected accordingly).
On the other hand, BPP advocates suggest that their policies may make it more difficult for
people not to follow policy prompts, but that this results in a much better set of welfare
results (particularly when it turns out that people actually aren’t that good at making
decisions that support their own long-term interests). What interests us about this Dutch
debate is that ethical considerations have been stimulated by BPP and not closed-off by it.
Consequently, while specific policies may obfuscate policy decisions in certain everyday
situations (by by-passing conscious action and decision-making), in other, often more stra-
tegic contexts, it appears that through a concern with actually existing welfare delivery they
can serve to open-up and re-politicize the policy formulation process itself.
Critical analyses of post-political theory have suggested that attention should be drawn to
the uneven development of the post-political condition (see Gill et al., 2012; Temenos, 2017).
The emergence of ethical debates around BPP in the Netherlands suggests that sensitivity to
the uneven development of the post-political condition should not, however, just be about
how the post-political is present in certain places while absent in others, but should also
recognize how certain practices of government have the potential to produce both political
and post-political affects at the same time. In this context, we argue that it is helpful to
consider the dialectical relations that often exist between the political and post-political, as
the post-politicization of one issue, in one context, results in its re-politicization elsewhere.
Questions of autonomy
Connected to concerns over the obfuscation of the policy process, BPP has also been subject
to critiques which suggest that it can lead to the diminution of personal autonomy. A key
moment within discussions about autonomy, self-government, and behavioural policy in the
Netherlands came in 2014, with the publication of the RMO’s Resisting Temptation report.
The RMO advises the Dutch government on a range of social issues.8
At its heart, the Resisting Temptation report is keen to establish the different political
visions that are encoded within BPP. As a representative of the RMO stated to us,
[. . .] what I find really funny in the discussion right now is that I think most people in the
Netherlands who are positive about nudging are positive because they see it as an extra way to
do things [. . .] [but] it could also be interesting for somebody who thinks the government should
be more liberal [. . .] it is claimed by people who want to do more, but you could use it to do less.
And that’s what we tried to do with reframing [in the Resisting Temptation Report]. It shouldn’t
be pushing people in the right direction [while] harming their autonomy, but it should be giving
people more space, giving people more freedom without leaving them behind [. . .] It’s a different
way of looking at it [. . .]. (Interview with RMO representative, May 2014)
The RMO recognizes that the non-regulatory nature of BPP can result in both more (wel-
farist) or less (liberalist) interventionist state systems. The key aim of the RMO report
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appears to be to ensure that BPP preserves personal autonomy, while realizing that this
autonomy is itself based upon certain capacities to act that depend on welfarist forms of
intervention (fusing together two of Sunstein’s separate ethical values). While the tension
here between liberty and equity is not new, it is interesting how attempts to respond to
emerging BPPs lead to new political discussions about this historical conundrum.
The RMO ultimately suggests that BBP could support the development of more mean-
ingful forms of autonomy, similar to what Sunstein refers to as self-government. Self-
government is distinct from autonomy to the extent that autonomy implies being unaffected
by behavioural government. The notion of self-government suggests the development of
capacities to act which focus more on self-authored decision-making techniques, as opposed
to externally construed nudges. The RMO representatives we spoke with positioned this
idea of autonomy and self-government in relation to concepts of positive and nega-
tive freedom,
So, we formulate an autonomy paradox. And that relates to this distinction of positive and
negative freedom where government increasingly is retreating from the public domain and
expects people to take their own responsibility. That could easily be framed as an expansion
of people’s negative freedom because there’s less and less distortion by government. But the
more [. . .] government expects people to take up their own responsibility, they expect people to
be autonomous to make conscious choices. And then comes in positive freedom because [. . .] if
people don’t have full agency, the awareness, the self-esteem, they can’t make those choices.
(Interview with RMO representatives, May 2014)
In the work of Amartya Sen (1993), negative freedom is interpreted as a form of autonomy
that is predicated on non-interference. Positive freedom, on the other hand, connects auton-
omy to the ability of someone not only to be free of coercion, but also to have the capa-
bilities to pursue their chosen paths in life. BPP is not easily categorized when it comes to
questions of positive and negative freedom. Nudges can be seen as an enhancer of negative
freedom (as a form of softer regulation than the law for instance), or something which
erodes negative forms of freedom (a nudge is still paternalist, no matter how soft). BBP
can, however, be seen to support positive freedom (making it easier for people to make the
decisions that are in their own long-term interest) and undermine such freedoms (as in many
forms it offers little in the way of behavioural capacity building).
According to the authors of the RMO report, there is a danger that BPPs could support
the emergence of fairly facile, neutral citizenship that does little to really enhance self-
governing capacities. As an RMO representative observed,
So, they [The WWR] said, well, the rest of society is pushing citizens in this direction like eating
unhealthy food. So, we should push back exactly to the same kind of degree of geometry. So that
in the end, he or she will end up in the middle [. . .] And that is what we feel very uncomfortable
with because who decides that it’s just a two-dimensional space? [. . .]. (Interview with RMO
representative, May 2014)
In this context, BPP could be seen to do enough to undermine liberal definitions of auton-
omy, but not enough to actually enhance positive freedom. The RMO report thus calls for
the deployment of alternative forms of BPP to promote much more active citizenship.
Although the Resisting Temptation report does not spell out how a more behaviourally
empowered citizenry could be formed, it is clearly suggestive of the development of systems
of behavioural education and learning that would support a meta-awareness of individual
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behaviour and its driving forces. The RMO’s thinking is different to the more overtly
political vision of an interventionist social democratic state that protects citizens from the
exploitative behavioural dynamics of neoliberalism proffered by Leggett (2014) (see above).
It is nevertheless indicative of the politicization of BBP thinking that has emerged in the
Netherlands.
In this section, we have seen how various challenges to the post-political tendencies of
BPP have been developed in a range of ordinary contexts, which have routinely been denied
proper political status within post-political theory. The Resisting Temptation report is sig-
nificant because not only does it come from a more ordinary space of politics, but also
because it offers a radical challenge to the conformist welfarist ethics of BPP. We acknowl-
edge that the formal, governmental advisory role of the RMO means that the inclusion of
its ideas within emerging forms of consensus around BPP could lead to their inevitable
de-radicalization (as post-political theorists would predict). Notwithstanding this,
we assert the very existence of Resisting Temptation report, and the debates it has generated,
should at least give us pause for thought when applying post-political critiques to BPP, and,
moreover, lead us to question the political assumptions of post-political thinking.
Is there a ‘Dutch nudge’, and is it more empowering and collective?
The previous section demonstrated that the emergence of BPPs in the Netherlands, and the
varied ethical and constitutional issues they raise, have directly led to political debates and
moments of contestation about the nature of human autonomy, welfare, self-government,
and the practices of obfuscation. The Netherlands has also been witness to a broader polit-
icization of BPP, which connects nudging, consensus politics, and questions of the public
good. These developments have moved discussion about the behavioural sciences and public
policy from the level of the individual (where much of the specialist academic debate has
been focused) into a broader social sphere. These developments have directly opened-up
discussions about the varied ways in which BPP may be linked to consensus formation.
One policy advisor we spoke to, for example, raised the important question concerning
when and why collective forms of political consensus may be needed to support a behav-
ioural policy intervention in the Netherlands,
[C]ould nudging or behavioural types of intervention [be applied to] goals that everybody
subscribes [to], or where there is a consensus about it [. . .] Or where consensus is lacking [. . .]
So, what they say is if you use nudge instruments, you should first have a discussion about the
paternalism behind the libertarian side, if you understand what I mean. So, there should be first
a discussion about what are the motives, the intentions [. . .] Because if it’s implicit, then you
depoliticize something that is really political. (Interview with academic government policy advi-
sor, Netherlands, May 2014)
This reflection raises two important points. The first is procedural, and it concerns the
importance of establishing some form of political consensus on the use of specific behav-
ioural policies. On these terms, consensus, by definition, involves open public discussion
about the motives and goals of behavioural policies so that the often-submerged policies
associated with nudge can be scrutinized before being applied. Consensus on these terms
could of course apply both to the goal of policy (perhaps increasing organ donation or
healthy eating) and the policy mechanism (resetting defaults/re-designing choice environ-
ments). The second issue raised here concerns situations where there may be an absence of
consensus. When there is an absence of consensus concerning either the goal of a
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behavioural policy and/or its means of delivery, it would appear that its application would
be much more controversial in the Netherlands. As we have already established, post-
politics is itself regarded as a pernicious product of expert consensuses, which removes
decision-making from the political spheres of contestation. But if achieving politically con-
tested consensus is prioritized precisely because of the obfuscating long-term potential of
nudge-style policies, then some of the post-political concerns surrounding BPP are lessened.
It is important to point out here, of course, that consensuses are not inherently post-
political: in their formation phases, consensuses can be the product of overt political antag-
onism. It is only once established that an enduring and largely unquestioned consensus
becomes post-political.
The issue of consensual decision-making raises broader questions concerning the con-
nections between BPP and the governing of collective action challenges (such as climate
change). Questions of collection action shift BPP from a focus on individual conduct to
questions of the public good. As one RMO representative observed,
A lot of people who are in favour of nudge say, ‘Well, nudge isn’t the problem because it only
strengthens your autonomy [. . .]’ But a question I think we dealt with a little bit [is] ‘Okay, but
what does the [RMO] Council think about using nudges for public problems?’ And public
problems are not always just for your own autonomy but are to steer people against their
own values or issues just because we have this collective problem, global warming, and we
don’t want people to put up the heat because they like it themselves. We want them to put it
down because otherwise, we have this collective [problem]. (Interview with RMO representative,
Netherlands, May 2014)
It is important to acknowledge that there is no precise line of demarcation, or necessary line
of contradiction, between individual behaviours and public interest. It is, however, clear that
individual and collective interests are not always well aligned. The application of nudge-type
policies to public, as well as individual behavioural, problems has actually been discussed in
other national contexts. In the UK, for example, the House of Lords Inquiry into BBP
suggested that individual opposition to behavioural policy is not a good reason to avoid
applying BPP in the broader public interest (House of Lords, 2011). It appears likely that in
the Netherlands, BPP will be used to address a range of public interest issues. It will there-
fore be intriguing to see what normative justifications will be offered by the Netherlands
government for using behavioural policy to address public problems that appear to run
counter to the interests/preferences of the individual.
One distinctive idea that is emerging in the Netherlands, which connects discussions
about BBP, collective politics, and public interest, is the notion of collaborative nudging.
In some ways, the idea of collaborative nudging builds on the insights of the self-nudging
movement.9 Collaborative nudging, however, takes this approach a stage further, and sug-
gests that the behavioural sciences could be mobilized at a collective social level. As one
policy advisor observed,
So, we say that if you have these controversial topics, you should involve citizens more and civic
organizations more and collaborate with them and use little experiments before you roll out the
whole programme for the whole country and because, first, you have to know what the effects
are and if the effects are the effects you want [. . .] Experiments with people, not just about people
or around them [. . .] but with them. (Interview with RMO representative, Netherlands,
May 2014)
14 EPC: Politics and Space 0(0)
The idea of collaborative nudging suggests that people and civic organization could be
engaged more actively in the experimental design of BBPs (see Jones et al., 2013). This
form of collective engagement could facilitate consensus decision-making not only at the
level of whether a policy should or not be delivered, but in the very form and function of the
policy itself. Collaborative nudging could also provide a context for communities (at a range
of scales) to openly discuss the tensions that may exist between individual and public
interests. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the idea of collaborative nudging
suggests a form of behavioural policy that recognizes that behaviours are constituted not
only at an individual but also at a social level. The idea of collaborative nudges is significant
because it again shows that BPP does not have to result in the diminution of human agency
or increases in political obfuscation, but instead can be connected to strategies of citizen
empowerment.
We do acknowledge that it is one thing for there to be strategic discussions about more
empowering, consensually oriented, and collective behavioural policy-making, but that it is
quite another for this to begin to shape policy. And, in the absence of any substantive
research on the actual long-term effects of the wide-spread use of BPP, there are currently
limited empirical resources on which to base strategies for designing empowering and col-
lective BPP, which can substantively accommodate political contestation and avoid narrow-
ing the terms of public debate. There is, however, already some evidence that more
collaborative forms of BPP are emerging at a municipal level in the Netherlands (see
Feitsma, 2018a for reflections on the Urban Nudging movement in Utrecht). The very
presence of these alternative forms of nudging suggests that BBP in the Netherlands is
generating forms of not only political resistance, but also political adaptions. Again,
while these adaptations of BBP may not reflect the forms of strong, state-orchestrated
political resistance to behavioural power envisaged by Leggett (2014), they do suggest
emerging forms of BBP in the Netherlands appear to be politicizing behavioural power in
both their forms and functions.
Conclusion: Behavioural insights and the (post)post-political
This paper has pursued two main goals. First, it has sought to connect together emerging
critiques of BBP through the concerns of post-political scholarship. Second, through con-
sideration of the emergence of a nascent psychological state apparatus in the Netherlands,
it has challenged the idea that the post-political is ever an accomplished and necessarily
clear-cut state of affairs. At the beginning of the paper, it was claimed that BPP could be
thought of as post-political in three main ways: (1) to the extent that they promote an
expert, non-ideological consensus on the nature of human action and how best to govern
it; (2) because of the psychological techniques they deploy to target the unconscious, and
which actively prevent acts of government being contested; and (3) because of the way in
which a focus on individual behaviour can potentially suffocate political debate over the
very framing of problems which are actually social, structural, and collective in nature.
Ultimately, this paper has revealed that the extent to which BPPs can be thought of and
critiqued as post-political phenomena depends fundamentally on the context within which
they are analysed. Consequently, while more generalized critiques of the post-political prob-
lems of BPP find some traction, more fined-grained empirical analysis of BPP landscapes
appears to cast doubt on post-political assumptions about the nature of politics, consensus,
antagonism, and expertise. This is evident in our consideration of the institutionalization of
expertise, which outlined how the Dutch state has been witness to the development of a
managerial cadre of behavioural insights expertise. Such forms of expertise are frequently
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the subject of post-political critique. Closer inspection of the nature of the Behavioural
Insights Network Netherlands, and related administrative structures, however, complicates
post-political critiques. The non-hierarchical structure, and diffuse form, of the Behavioural
Insights Network Netherlands, appears to lend itself to a diverse set of behavioural govern-
mental and scientific interactions and ultimately to the contestation of expertise. While this
paper openly acknowledges that these forms of struggle and contestation within the deep
state may not reflect the radical antagonisms promoted by critics of the post-political, they
clearly complicate the idea that the institutionalization of behavioural expertise necessarily
closes-off contestation.
In the case of the establishment of BPP in the Netherlands, we have also seen that the
formation of a scientific and political consensus is far more contingent than routinely por-
trayed within the writings of advocates of BPP and in post-political critique. In the
Netherlands, we found that consensus was challenged by politico-ethical divides and even
unintentionally stalled because of bureaucratic procedure. In noticing that a lack of con-
sensus does not necessarily signal antagonism, and that consensus can easily give way to
dissensus, the analysis presented in this paper supports the position that the post-political
condition is neither militated against by a lack of consensus nor, necessarily, undermined by
consensual actions.
This paper also considered the accusations of political obfuscation and diminished political
autonomy that are routinely levelled at BPP. Our analysis revealed that while behavioural
policies may obfuscate policy decisions in certain everyday situations (particularly in the
form of unconscious nudges), in other, often more strategic contexts, it appears that they
can serve to open-up and re-politicize the policy formulation process itself (particularly in
relation to broader debates about the balancing of the ethical values of welfare, autonomy,
human dignity, and self-government). In this sense, there appears to be something in the
(seemingly) controversial nature of BPP that engenders new public and political discussion
on the appropriate relationship between the state and its citizens. In terms of diminished
political autonomy and the potential for the alternative development of collective nudges, the
paper has demonstrated that while certain forms of BPP clearly have the potential to
damage (thin) forms of autonomy, it is possible to conceive of behavioural policies that
support the advancement of positive forms of freedom and collective action.
Ultimately, this paper has exposed a complex set of dialectics that connect together the
political and post-political conditions. These are dialectics that are often only evident at an
empirical level and when what counts as being properly political takes a less radical and
more banal form. This does not, of course, mean that BPP should not be subject to post-
political critique – it may, often, be a justified critical perspective. Nor does it mean that the
Netherlands is in any way typical of how different political constituencies have engaged with
BPP. What the case of the development of BPP in the Netherlands does indicate is that
related policies are not necessarily post-political in form and that it may be helpful to
rethink how we conceive of the very notion of the post-political condition in practical terms.
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Notes
1. In total, we interviewed 10 representatives from 7 organizations, including the Ministry of the
Interior, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment,
the Netherlands School of Public Administration, Utrecht University, Tilburg University, and
the International Institute of Social Sciences. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their
involvement in the promotion, analysis, or contestation of BBP in the Netherlands. The interviews
were semi-structured in nature, which not only enabled key themes/topics to be raised, but also
allowed scope for the interviewees to elaborate on novel and/or unanticipated themes.
The interviews were transcribed in full and analysed using a mix of inductive and deductive
coding. The coded interviews were synthesized into an analysis report, which facilitated the iden-
tification of key themes and indicative quotes. Each interviewee was presented with a full transcript
of their interview for approval. They were also asked to complete a research consent form, which
granted permission for sections of their interviews to be reported anonymously in written papers
and reports. The full transcripts of some of these interviews, and related interview schedules and
ethical consent forms, are available for download at the UK Data Service: http://reshare.ukdata
service.ac.uk/851870/.
2. One, very much overlooked, point of connection concerns the scientific doubt that BPP casts on the
ability of humans to form stable systems of rational consensus over long periods of time. Mouffe
(2005: 3) actually reflects on some of the problematic psychological assumptions of post-political
practices when she discusses the tension between human reciprocity and hostility and the strange
hostility which psychology still experiences within political studies. Mouffe’s reflections are, how-
ever, framed in the context of Freud’s psychoanalytical work, and not modern behaviou-
ral economics.
3. In the UK, the Cabinet Office had been exploring the application of new behavioural insights in
various policy areas since the early 2000s (Jones et al., 2013). In the US, President Obama’s
appointment of Cass Sunstein to head up the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs sig-
nalled an intent to apply behavioural economics and nudge techniques within the policy-making
process. It is important in this context to note how the apparent success and prestige of policies in
other places can support the post-political adoption of those policy in others as seemingly sensible
acts of good practice replication (see Clarke, 2011; Temenos, 2017).
4. Representatives from the Dutch Government visited the UK to see first-hand the work of the BIT,
and representatives from the Team have also been to the Netherlands to talk about their work to
policy-makers (representatives from the Dutch government have also visited the US to find out
about the impacts of the behavioural sciences on public policy at a Federal level there).
5. In the UK, the Cabinet Office provided a central hub where the BIT could be located and connected
to the work of a series of government departments.
6. This assertion, in part, rests on the erroneous assumption that all BPPs involve subconscious
nudges, which they clearly do not (see Oliver, 2013).
7. The potential for behavioural insight policies to stimulate political debate and scrutiny is also
evident in the UK, where related policies prompted a formal House of Lords Inquiry (through
the Science and Technology Committee) and related report (see House of Lords, 2011)
8. In its recommendations and reports, the Council examines and explains the significance of new
social developments in terms of policy. Central to the Council’s deliberations is the modern citizen in
the setting of today’s society.
9. The self-nudging movement suggests that one way of addressing the ethical issues raised by BPP is by
encouraging individuals to use the insights of the behavioural sciences to shape their own behaviours.
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